
Cisco Intrusion Prevention System Security Target
Exceptions to
Shall/Shall Not
Statement(s)
6.1.2 Each Party
Generates an Ephemeral
Key Pair; No Static
Keys are Used, C(2, 0)
6.1.2.1 dhEphem, C(2,
0, FFC DH)
6.1.2.2 Ephemeral
Unified Model, C(2, 0,
ECC CDH)
6.1.2.3 Rationale for
Choosing a C(2, 0)
Scheme
6.2 Schemes Using
One Ephemeral Key
Pair, C(1)
6.2.1 Initiator Has a
Static Key Pair and
Generates an Ephemeral
Key Pair; Responder
Has a Static Key Pair,
C(1, 2)
6.2.1.1
dhHybridOneFlow, C(1,
2, FFC DH)
6.2.1.2 One-Pass
Unified Model, C(1, 2,
ECC CDH)
TOE does not use ECC.
TOE would use C(2,0)
6.2.1.3 MQV1, C(1, 2,
FFC MQV)
6.2.1.4 One-Pass
MQV, C(1, 2, ECC
MQV)
TOE does not use ECC.
TOE would use C(2,0)
6.2.1.5 Rationale for
Choosing a C(1, 2)
Scheme
6.2.2 Initiator
Generates Only an
Ephemeral Key Pair;
Responder Has Only a
Static Key Pair, C(1, 1)
6.2.2.1 dhOneFlow,
C(1, 1, FFC DH)
6.2.2.2 One-Pass
Diffie-Hellman, C(1, 1,
ECC CDH)
TOE does not use ECC.
TOE would use C(2,0)
6.2.2.3 Rationale in
Choosing a C(1, 1)
Scheme
6.3 Scheme Using No
Ephemeral Key Pairs,
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